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Note
THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT AND THE
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING DILEMMA
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the concept of zoning as a form of land use regulation first received judicial approval in 1926,1 suburban communities have utilized zoning ordinances to prevent unwanted development. 2 Typically, the goal of
precluding development may be achieved by means of zoning ordinances
that effectually exclude outsiders along economic lines, thereby preserving
3
the suburban character of the community.
For more than a decade, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court attempted to
1. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding
the power of the states to regulate property use by promulgating zoning laws). See
also National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa.
504, 521, 215 A.2d 597, 606 (1965).
The Supreme Court's Euclid decision set forth the proposition that zoning is constitutional when enacted for the health, safety, or general welfare of the community.
272 U.S. at 391. This proposition has been similarly embraced by Pennsylvania case
law. See Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 374, 200 A.2d 408, 413 (1964)
(the right to use property is subject to the police power of the state to regulate an
owner's use of property, provided that the regulation is reasonably necessary to protect the health, safety, welfare, or general morals of the people); Appeal of Glorioso,
413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964) (zoning ordinances must bear reasonable relationship to police power purposes); Eller v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 1, 198 A.2d 863
(1964) (regulation adopted pursuant to police power must not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or confiscatory).
2. Hyson, The Impact of Act 219 of 1978 Upon the Casey Pending Ordinance Doctrine
in Pennsylvania Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 26 VILL. L. REV. 322, 324 (1980).

Generally, the authority to zone is granted to local municipalities pursuant to an
express delegation by a state of its police power. Developments in the Lau-Zoning, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1429 (1978).
In Pennsylvania, the exclusionary zoning dilemma is exacerbated by the legislative limitation that nonresidents of a community do not have standing to challenge
that community's zoning ordinance as exclusionary. See 53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,
§ 11004(1) (Purdon 1972). Although this note does not endeavor to analyze this major impediment to achieving balanced housing communities, see note 27 for a brief
additional discussion of the standing issue.
3. See Hyson, supra note 2, at 324. For purposes of this note, exclusionary zoning
means land-use controls which tend to exclude persons of low or moderate incomes
from the zoning municipality. See R. ANDERSON, LAW OF ZONING IN PENNSYLVANIA
146 (1982). On account of the economic orientation of suburban zoning ordinances,
one commentator appropriately referred to such zoning practices as "snob zoning."
See generally, Note, Snob Zoning--A Look at the Economic and Social Impact ofLow Intensity
Zoning, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 507 (1964). Because zoning schemes are promulgated
and enacted by local legislative and administrative bodies, it is not surprising that
zoning, which was designed as a method of development, has been transformed into
an effective method for frustrating growth. See Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme

(477)
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eradicate the exclusionary effect of such ordinances by attacking the specific
zoning techniques utilized by suburban communities, and by fashioning
remedies which responded only to the specific mischief alleged. 4 These narrowly fashioned remedies, created on a case-by-case basis, represented a
piecemeal approach to the exclusionary zoning dilemma. When zoning municipalities discovered a means to circumvent the zoning obligations developed under the piecemeal approach, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
purported to adopt a more wide-sweeping, fair share approach. 5 However,
this approach has also proven to be inadequate, as recent decisions purporting to apply a fair share analysis have permitted municipalities to continue
to deny housing opportunities to our expanding society. 6 This application of
Court and Exclusionay Suburban Zoning.- From Bilbar to Girsh-A Decade of Change, 16
VILL. L. REV. 507, 508 (1971).
Several commentators have attempted to analyze the suburban mentality behind exclusionary zoning restrictions. See, e.g., Note, Apartments in the Suburbs, In re
Appeal of Girsh, 74 DICK. L. REV. 634, 640-41 (1969-70). The author of the note
suggests that suburbanites, feeling that they have struggled to escape from the city
and obtain the advantages of suburban life, wish to preserve their lifestyle against
urban encroachment. Id. at 640. This desire for preservation may be reflected by
restrictions against multi-family and small single-lot zoning. Id. Thus, the suburbanites' ideological basis for such restrictions may be to protect themselves from the ills
which prompted them to leave the city in the first place. See Babcock & Bosselman,
Suburban Zoning and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1040 (1963). These authors list both "shouted" and "whispered" reasons for the opposition to apartment
development in suburban municipalities. Id. at 1062-71. They list the following as
"shouted" reasons:
1. 'Apartments don't pay their own way! If we allow apartments to come
in, our taxes will go up!'
2. Apartments reduce light and air.
3. '[T]he builders of suburban apartments are constructing tomorrow's
slums.'
4. 'Apartments will reduce property value.'
5. Apartments will injure the character of the neighborhood.
Id. at 1062-67. As "whispered" reasons, the authors list the following:
1. 'Apartments will attract persons of the lower classes.'
2. 'Multiple-family housing will bring in a lot of transients who have no
interest in the neighborhood.'
3. 'If we let them build apartments they'll be renting to Negroes ..
Id. at 1067-71.
4. See, e.g., Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (invalidating a de
facto ban on apartment buildings). See also Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970) (invalidating two to three-acre minimum lot size requirements);
National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504,
215 A.2d 597 (1965) (striking down four-acre minimum lot size requirements).
5. See Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d
466 (1975). In the Wilhstown decision, a plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court applied a fair share approach to strike down the zoning community's attempt
to circumvent the judicial mandate that municipalities can not totally exclude apartment development by setting aside only a token amount of acreage for multi-family
uses. Id. Two years later, the court gave majority approval to the fair share approach. See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977). For a
further discussion of the Wil/istown and Surrick decisions, see notes 68-87 and accompanying text, infra.
6. See, e.g., Appeal of M. A. Kravitz, Inc., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983) (a
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the fair share analysis, as well as the court's earlier piecemeal approach, reflects a position of judicial reluctance to address squarely the problems created by exclusionary zoning. 7 In response, this note will point out the need
for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to take a more active role in this arena
and a more effective and holistic approach to enforcing the duty of municizoning ordinance which did not provide for a fair share of multi-family housing was
not unconstitutionally exclusionary where the municipality was not a logical place
for future development); Appeal of Elocin, 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983) (a zoning ordinance which did not provide for a fair share of multi-family housing was not
unconstitutionally exclusionary where the zoning community was already substantially developed). For a further discussion of the Kravitz and Elocin decisions, see
notes 88-111 and accompanying text infra.
7. Cf. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel County, 92 N.J.
159, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (hereinafter cited as Mi. Laurel If). The At. Laurel II decision is a commendable attempt to face, head on, the exclusionary zoning dilemma.
This decision not only rebukes suburban municipalities for utilizing exclusionary
zoning schemes, but also attempts to provide a means for producing increased low
and moderate income housing throughout the state of New Jersey. For an excellent
discussion of the Mt. Laurel II decision, see Rose, The Mt. Laurel II Decision: Is It
Basedon Wihful Thinking?, 12 REAL EST. L.J. 115 (1983); 112 N.J.L.J. 1 (1983).
The New Jersey Supreme Court first demonstrated its willingness to take an
active role in the exclusionary zoning arena in 1975. See Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975)
(hereinafter cited as Mt. Laurel I). In Mount Laurel !, the New Jersey Supreme Court
placed upon developing municipalities an affirmative obligation to zone for their fair
share of the regional housing needs for low and moderate income housing. Id. This
approach, therefore, differed from the approach previously employed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in that it attempted to erradicate exclusionary zoning by
creating a system which was to provide for balanced housing, rather than by creating
a system of favored and disfavored uses. For further discussion of the differences
between the Pennsylvania and New Jersey approaches, see note 86 infra.
The M. Laurel II decision was written to effectively implement the goals set
forth in Mt. Laurel!. Rose, supra, at 115. In summary, M. Laurel!! directs all communities designated as containing growth areas pursuant to the State Development
Guide Plan, to provide housing for their own indigenous poor and for a fair share of
the region's low and moderate income families. See, 112 N.J.L.J. 21 (1983).
The provision of such housing is to be accomplished through both the removal
of existing exclusionary schemes and the imposition of affirmative zoning techniques,
such as mandatory set asides, density bonuses, and cooperation with developers' efforts to obtain subsidies. Id. Moreover, all future zoning litigation is to be handled
by three judges appointed by the chief justice. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court deserves much credit for its willingness to become an active participant in the land-use arena, and for its creativity in fashioning a
system to preclude further exclusionary zoning. However, despite the noble goals of
M. Laurel II, commentators have recognized that weaknesses in that decision exist.
See generally, Rose, supra. Specifically, Professor Rose has questioned whether the policy goals of Mt. Laurel!!1 can actually be achieved in light of current economic realities. d. at 137. Another commentator has questioned the fairness of placing the
responsibility for subsidizing low-income housing on builders and purchasers of new
homes. Bernstein, Why Mount Laurel Won't Work, 112 N.J.L.J. 21 (1983). Moreover,
it is submitted that the delegation of all future exclusionary zoning cases to three
judicially-selected judges may come under constitutional attack. For these reasons, it
is suggested that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should emulate the active position
adopted by the New Jersey bench, though not necessarily by adopting the approach
itself.
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8
palities to zone for the regional community.
Generally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions on the exclusionary zoning issue can be characterized under three modes of analysis: the
10
and the fair-share
large lot analysis, 9 the total exclusion of use analysis,
1
obligation analysis.
The first two modes of analysis originally appeared to be distinct, and
were applied in direct response to the type of mischief embodied in the challenged zoning ordinance. It is these decisions, promulgated under the largelot analysis and the total exclusion of use analysis, that are submitted to
12
Specifically, the
represent a "piecemeal" approach to exclusionary zoning.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied a substantive due process approach
where it determined that the ordinance was exclusionary due to large mini13
Alternatively, the court appeared to apply aper se
mum lot requirements.
analysis where the zoning ordinance effected a total prohibition of multifamily uses. 14

8. See Developments in the Law--Zoning,supra note 2, at 1639. Commentators have
observed that Pennsylvania has analyzed the exclusionary zoning issue by establishing a list of favored uses. Id. This practice should be compared with that of New
Jersey, which is not concerned with the protection of particular uses, but rather, with
providing for "balanced communities." Id. For a further discussion of the difference
between the New Jersey and Pennsylvania theories of exclusionary zoning, see note
86 znfra. For a brief discussion of New Jersey's most recent articulation on the exclusionary zoning issue, see note 7 supra.
9. For a discussion of the large-lot analysis, see notes 17-37 and accompanying
text infia. This analysis emerged in response to zoning schemes which sought to preserve the suburban, low-density character of communities by requiring large minimum lots. See, e.g., National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of
Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (zoning scheme requiring minimum of
four acres per lot held unconstitutional); Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. 466,
268 A.2d 765 (1970) (two and three-acre minimum lot restrictions declared unconstitutional because of the effect of freezing population density at near-present levels).
In addition to preserving population density, large minimum-lot sizes also ensure
that potential residents will be relatively affluent because large-lot zoning raises the
price of residential access, thereby denying that access to members of low income
groups. See Sager, Tight Little Islands.- Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Pro/ection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 767 (1969).

10. See, e.g., Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (failure of zoning
scheme to provide for apartment development rendered ordinance unconstitutionally
exclusionary). For a discussion of Girsh, see notes 38-61 and accompanying text infra.
It has been noted that the total exclusion of multiple dwellings was left unchallenged
in most jurisdictions until 1970. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 256 (1982).
11. For a discussion of the fair share obligation as adopted by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, see notes 62-87 and accompanying text infra.
12. See text at notes 4 & 5 supra. It is submitted that this approach is piecemeal
because it seeks to remedy the situation by addressing only the specific issue
presented by the case, rather than by taking a more holistic approach to the exclusionary zoning dilemma.
13. See National Land and Inv. v. Eastown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419
Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
14. See Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (failure to provide for
apartments rendered zoning ordinance unconstitutional). For a discussion of Glush,
see notes 38-61 and accompanying text infra.
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Unlike these first two modes of analysis, the application of the fair share
analysis is not dependent upon the type of mischief alleged. 15 Rather, recent
decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicate that these earlier
modes of analyzing zoning ordinances have been abandoned, and in their
stead, a fair share analysis has been adopted as the appropriate bench mark
for testing the validity of zoning ordinances which are challenged as
6
exclusionary. '
II.

MODES OF ANALYSIS

A.

The Large Lot Analyszs

The first important Pennsylvania Supreme Court case to address directly the validity of large-lot zoning was National Land Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment.' 7 In National Land, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that a four-acre minimum lot requirement was unconstitutional as applied to residential districts in Easttown Township. 18 After
15. For a discussion of Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases that utilize the fair
share approach in analyzing exclusionary zoning, see notes 62-111 and accompanying text infra. The fair share approach has been employed where the challenged
mischief is both tokenism and total exclusion of a particular use. See, e.g., Appeal of
M. A. Kravitz Co., Inc., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983) (fair share test employed
where zoning community failed to provide for townhouse development); Township of
Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975) (fair share
approach employed where zoning community set aside only a token amount of acreage for multi-family uses). Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not had
the opportunity to decide a large-lot case since its acceptance of the fair share approach, it is submitted that this approach would be utilized in such a case because
both modes of analysis are essentially substantive due process approaches. See Note,
Zoning- Constitutionality of Exclusionary Zoning Ordinance-FairShare, 17 DuQ. L. REV.
507, 510 (1978-79) (the Pennsylvania fair share test is essentially a substantive due
process test). For a discussion of the Pennsylvania large-lot zoning decisions see notes
17-37 and accompanying text iqfra.
16. See,e.g., Appeal of M. A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983) (in
situation where developer challenged zoning ordinance as creating a total exclusion
of use, supreme court applied three factors of Surnik fair share test to determine
whether a township provided a fair share of acreage for multi-family development);
Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983) (in a challenge to zoning
ordinance on grounds that the ordinance totally excluded townhouses and mid- or
high-rise apartments, court upheld ordinance through utilization of fair share analysis). For a discussion of the Kravitz and Elocin decisions, see notes 88-111 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the Surrick fair share test, see notes 76-87 and
accompanying text infra.
17. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). One commentator observed that until the
1960's, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court "permitted unfettered exercise of broad local governmental control" over municipal zoning. Comment, supra note 3, at 512-13.
For an example of this deference to local governing bodies, see Bilbar Constr. Co. v.
Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 393 Pa. 62, 141 A.2d 851 (1958) (validity of
large-lot ordinance upheld on general welfare considerations, despite the fact that the
ordinance bore no reasonable relationship to the health, safety, or morals of the community). Thus, the National Land case may be viewed as a turning point for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in refusing to defer to the local zoning municipality.
18. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). In NationalLand, the title holder of an 85acre tract, "Sweetbriar," agreed to sell the property to National Land and Invest-
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disposing of the procedural issues presented, 1 9 Justice Roberts set out the
legal parameters for exclusionary zoning: the constitutional guarantee of the
right to use property 20 and the judicial mandate that zoning ordinances are
valid when enacted pursuant to the state's police power for promotion of the
health, safety, and general welfare of the community. 21 Weighing the interests of the parties in order to determine whether the four-acre minimum lot
restriction bore a substantial relationship to the general welfare of the community, the court took into account the interests of the developer, the munic22
ipality, and those persons desiring to settle within the community.
ment Company, the agreement to sell being contingent upon approval of subdivision
and development plans for the tract by the local governing body. Id. at 508, 215
A.2d at 600. At the time of the purchase agreement, the zoning for the Sweetbriar
tract required a one-acre minimum lot for each residence; however, in 1962, shortly
after the purchase by National Land and Investment Company, an amendment to
the zoning ordinance was passed requiring a minimum of four acres per building lot.
Id. at 508-09, 215 A.2d at 600.
In its decision, the National Land court expressly stated that it was not ruling on
the constitutionality of all large-lot restrictions, because "[e]very zoning ordinance
involves a different set of facts and circumstances .... " Id. at 523, 215 A.2d at 60708. Thus, when turning to the constitutionality of the ordinance in question, the
court considered the large-lot restriction only "in the factual context of the instant
case." Id. at 524, 215 A.2d at 608.
19. Id. at 508-18, 215 A.2d at 600-05. At the time National Land was decided,
there existed a procedural question concerning the propriety of filing a request for a
variance before prosecuting an appeal based on a constitutional challenge. See Comment, supra note 3, at 521, n.65. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court utilized National
Land as an opportunity to elaborate on the proper relationship between an application for a variance and a constitutional challenge. 419 Pa. at 511, 215 A.2d at 60102. The court stated that a party petitioning for a variance is permitted to challenge
the constitutionality of an ordinance either in front of the local zoning board, or if
unsuccessful, on appeal to the court of common pleas. Id. Relying on this interpretation, the court ruled that the National Land and Investment Company could properly shift its emphasis from a variance to a constitutional challenge prior to the
hearing before the board of adjustment. Id. at 511, 215 A.2d at 601-02.
20. 419 Pa. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607. The NationalLand court noted that a landowner's right to use property is guaranteed by both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Id. at n.20. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; PA. CONST.
art. I, §§ 1, 10. See also note 1 supra. Writing for the court, Justice Roberts stated
that while recognizing the presumption of validity of zoning ordinances, "we must
also appreciate the fact that zoning involves governmental restrictions upon a landowner's constitutionally guaranteed right to use his property, a right which is unfettered except in very specific instances." 419 Pa. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607 (footnotes
omitted). According to Justice Roberts, these specific instances include the following:
1) if the landowner violates the state or federal constitution; 2) if the landowner creates a nuisance; 3) if the landowner violates any convenant, restriction, or easement;
and 4) if the landowner violates any valid zoning laws, including zoning regulations.
Id. at n.21.
21. 419 Pa. at 522, 215 A.2d at 607. For a brief discussion regarding the constitutionality of zoning ordinances, see note 1 supra.
22. 419 Pa. at 523-27, 215 A.2d at 608-09. See Comment, supra note 3 ("[t]he
key to the true decisional basis of National Land may be found through an examination of the fundamental balancing of interests approach employed by the court in
reaching its result"). In considering the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance,
Justice Roberts first identified the interest of the landowner-developer; that is, the
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Justice Roberts' initial emphasis on the developers' loss of profits resulting from four-acre lot restrictions2 3 indicated that in large-lot zoning cases,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rely on a traditional zoning analysis
of whether the large-lot requirement had imposed an unreasonable restriction on the right of a landowner to use his property. 24 After rejecting the
township's justification for requiring large, minimum lot restrictions, 25 the
court concluded that the restriction was invalid.2 6 Although this fact is significant, the National Land decision is pivotal because the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court joined with the traditional analysis a new approach. This
newly-created inquiry focused upon the responsibility of the municipality to
diminution in value of the property if limited to four-acre lots. Id. at 523-24, 215
A.2d at 608. Justice Roberts then expressed that the interest of the landowner-developer must be weighed against the interest of the municipality. Id. at 525, 215 A.2d at
608. In addition to the interests of the parties to the action, the NationalLand court
further considered the regional interest in population expansion. Id. at 523-27, 215
A.2d at 609. One commentator has suggested that it is the presence of this third,
regional interest "which colors the court's assessment of the proper weight to be given
to the arguments of the other two interests." See Comment, supra note 3, at 622. For
a discussion of the interests asserted by the municipality in NationalLand, see note 25
infra .

23. 419 Pa. at 524, 215 A.2d at 608. Justice Roberts noted that the four-acre lot
restrictions would obviously diminish the value of the developer's property and
greatly restrict the marketability of the tract. Id. Justice Roberts noted that when
divided into one acre lots as originally planned, the value of "Sweetbriar" for residential building was approximately $260,000. Id. When the four-acre restriction was
imposed, the number of available building sites was reduced by 75% and the value of
the land, under even the most optimistic appraisal, fell to $175,000. Id.
24. Id. at 522-25, 215 A.2d at 607-08. The NationalLand court began its discussion by stating the general proposition that zoning presents a governmental restriction upon a landowner's guaranteed right to use his property. Id. at 522, 215 A.2d at
607. Against this general proposition, the court then considered the extent to which
the restriction deprived the landowner of his property's value. Id. at 523-25, 215
A.2d at 608.
25. Id. at 531, 215 A.2d at 611. The appellee township cited four public purposes as justifications for the large minimum-lot requirement. Id. at 525-31, 215 A.2d
at 608-11. Specifically, the township alleged that the four-acre minimum lot requirement was necessary because 1) it ensured proper sewage disposal and protection from
water pollution, 2) the township roads were inadequate and one-acre zoning would
impose upon the road system, 3) the large-lot restriction served to preserve the character of the area in regard to open spaces, and 4) the restriction was necessary to
present the historic sites in the township in the proper setting. Id. The court rejected
the first two arguments alleged by the township, reasoning that zoning may not be
used to avoid the increased responsibilities brought by natural growth. Id. at 527-28,
215 A.2d at 610. The court stated as follows:
Zoning is a tool in the hands of governmental bodies which enables them to
more effectively meet the demands of evolving and growing communities.
It must not and can not be used by those officials as an instrument by which
they may shirk their responsibilities. Zoning is a means by which a governmental body can plan for the future, it cannot be used as a means to deny
the future.
Id. In response to the last two proffered justifications, the court emphasized that they
did not reflect the public welfare, and were based purely on private interests, which
zoning regulations may not be employed to effectuate. Id. at 531, 215 A.2d at 611.
26. Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 613.
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accommodate its share of the developmental needs of an expanding society
by considering the interest of persons desiring to live within the municipality.27 It is the acknowledgment of this regional interest which subsequently
formed the basis for imposing a fair share obligation

municipalities.

28

upon

zoning

In NationalLand, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explicitly stated that
large, minimum lot requirements were not unconstitutional per se, 29 and that
"[e]very zoning case involves a different set of facts and circumstances in
'30
light of which the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance must be tested."
As this proposition left unclear the future of large, minimum lot zoning restrictions, it is not surprising that, five years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was again presented with this issue in Concord Township Appeal.3 1 In
Concord Township, a plurality of the supreme court reaffirmed its earlier reasoning in National Land by stating that a two or three-acre minimum lot
requirement would be unreasonable "absent some extraordinary justification." 32 Although Justice Roberts' opinion in Concord Township did not re27. Id. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612. In response to the township's justifications for
requiring large, minimum-lot restrictions, the NationalLand court stated as follows:
Four acre zoning represents Easttown's position that it does not desire to
accommodate those who are pressing for admittance to the township ...
The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the
natural forces which send our growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place to live. We have concluded not.
A zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of
newcomers in order to avoid future burdens

. . .

can not be held valid.

Id.
Although the NationalLand court recognized this interest of third persons outside
the zoning community, Pennsylvania law still does not permit such third persons to
challenge a zoning ordinance as exclusionary. See Hyson, supra note 2, at 324, 325
n.7. Only landowners, or persons who have an interest in property located in the
zoning community, may challenge zoning legislation as exclusionary. Id. This limitation that non-residents may not bring such a challenge is mandated by statute. See
53 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(1) (Purdon 1972). Thus, the only means by which
housing for this regional interest could ever be provided in Pennsylvania is through a
landowner-developer. Cf Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 159 n.3, 336 A.2d 713, 717 n.3 (1975) (in New Jersey, nonresident individuals have standing to challenge zoning ordinance).
28. For a discussion of the development of the fair share obligation as applied
by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, see notes 62-87 and accompanying text infra.
Commentators have suggested that while the National Land opinion is of great
importance to Pennsylvania's development of exclusionary zoning principles, the
large-lot zoning restriction in NationalLand could have been invalidated solely upon a
more traditional due process analysis; that is, by focusing on the reasonableness of the
restriction in terms of the rights of the landowner. See RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING
LAW AND PRACTICE, 1 LAW PRACTICE FORMS § 3.5.7, at 100 (1981).
29. 419 Pa. at 523, 215 A.2d at 608.
30. Id. at 523, 215 A.2d at 607-08.
31. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). In Concord Township Appeal, the township
board of adjustment denied the developer's request for a rezoning and upheld two
and three-acre minimum lot requirements. Id. at 469, 268 A.2d at 766. The developers filed a petition for appeal which was granted by the supreme court.
32. Id. at 471, 268 A.2d at 767. Justice Roberts reiterated and expounded upon
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ceive the support of a majority of the court, 33 the decision is nevertheless
significant because it demonstrated that zoning ordinances which serve to
maintain population density by imposing large, minimum-lot restrictions
34
would be upheld only where there are extraordinarily strong justifications.
Specifically, these justifications must be strong enough to outweigh both the
developers' right to use property and the state's interest in accommodating
35
population growth.
the National Land principle that minimum lot sizes are not inherently unreasonable.
Id. at 470-71, 268 A.2d at 766-67. In analyzing the constitutionality of the requirements in question, Justice Roberts indicated that such a requirement would be reasonable only when "necessary," and not merely when "desirable." Id. Before even
addressing the issue of regional needs, he wrote,
The two and three acre minimums imposed in this case are no more reasonable than the four acre requirements struck down in National Land. As we
pointed out in National Land, there are obvious advantages to the residents
of the community in having houses build on four- or three-acre lots. However, minimum lot sizes of the magnitude required by this ordinance are a
gread deal larger than what should be considered as a necessaly size for the
building of a house, and are therefore not the proper subjects of public
regulation. .

.

. Absent some extraordinary justification, a zoning ordi-

nance with minimum lot sizes such as those in this case is completely
unreasonable.
Id. (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
33. Only Justices Eagen and O'Brien joined in Justice Roberts' opinion stating
that large-lot zoning is invalid in a suburban context absent extraordinary justification. Id. at 468, 768 A.2d at 765. Chief Justice Bell filed an opinion concurring in
the conclusion that the large-lot limitations were unreasonably restrictive. Id. at 47881, 268 A.2d at 771-72 (Bell, C.J., concurring). Thus, the plurality opinion reflected
the more traditional approach to large-lot zoning which permeated the NationalLand
majority opinion. For a discussion of the NationalLand opinion, see notes 17-28 and
accompanying text supra. The three dissenting justices accepted the proposition that
large-lot zoning should not be utilized as a means to divert growth, yet concluded
that the evidence concerning the potential sewage problem was sufficient to sustain
the validity of the large-lot requirement. 439 Pa. at 481-98, 268 A.2d at 772-80 (Cohen, Jones, and Pomeroy, J.J., dissenting).
34. See RYAN, supra note 28, at 99.
It is submitted that the National Land and Concord Townshz cases illustrate the
two-tiered substantive due process approach that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
utilized when confronted with a zoning ordinance alleged to be exclusionary. See
Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 188, 382 A.2d 105, 108 (1977) (noting
that the approach used in these earlier cases was essentially a substantive due process
analysis).
35. 439 Pa. at 474-75, 268 A.2d at 768-69. This regional interest, recognized by
a majority of the court in National Land, was a major factor in the Concord Township
Appeal decision. Id. For a discussion of the interest of third persons as recognized by
the National Land majority, see notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra. In his
Concord Township opinion, Justice Roberts re-emphasized the exclusionary effect that
large, minimum-lot requirements had on the broader regional community. 439 Pa.
at 474-75, 268 A.2d at 768-69. Justice Roberts stated,
The implication of National Land is that communities must deal with the
problems of population growth. They may not refuse to confront the future
by adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict population at near
present levels. It is not for any given township to say who may or may not
live within its confines, while disregarding the interests of the entire area. If
Concord Township is successful in unnaturally limiting its population
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Although both National Land and Concord Appeal recognized a regional
interest of persons living outside the boundaries of the zoning municipality,
these decisions may be characterized as passive because they did not fashion
36
Specifia remedy that responded to this acknowledged regional interest.
cally, these decisions merely discourage municipalities from zoning large-lot
tracts, rather than imposing an affirmative obligation to provide for in3 7
creased housing opportunities.
B.

Total Exclusion of Use

A separate mode by which a township can maintain its suburban character of low-density residential housing is to totally exclude particular uses,
such as apartment or townhouse development. 38 In Appeal of Girsh,39 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court set forth the approach to be used by a court
when faced with an ordinance alleged to be exclusionary on the grounds that
it effectively prohibited apartment development throughout the municipality.4 ° In Girsh, the court applied exclusionary zoning principles and held
growth through the use of exclusionary regulations, the people who would
normally live there will inevitably have to live in another community and
the requirement that they do so is not a decision that Concord Township

should alone be able to make.
36. See Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 2, at 1640.
37. It is submitted that these decisions reflect a judicial characterization of large
minimum lot requirements as disfavored uses, as compared with zoning ordinances
which contain a high proportion of small-lot zoning districts. This creation of a system of favored uses has been criticized as a less-than-optimal approach. See generally
Developments in the Law-Zoning, supra note 2, at 1639-40.
38. See generally, R. ANDERSON, supra note 2, at 258-63. Exclusion of apartments
and townhouses can be effected by zoning ordinance in one of two ways: 1) by expressly prohibiting multi-family development, or 2) by failing to provide for apartment or townhouse development. Id.
For example, in one case, the appellee
township argued that the zoning ordinance should not be deemed unconstitutional
because the ordinance merelyfailed to provide for apartments, as opposed to expressly
excluding apartment development. Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 240, 263 A.2d 395,
396 (1970). Thus, the township argued that its ordinance was distinguishable from
ordinances that amounted to total exclusions because, under its ordinance, apartment use by variance was available. Id. The court rejected this distinction stating
that "the failure to provide for apartments anywhere within the Township must be
viewed as the legal equivalent of an explicit prohibition of apartment houses in the
zoning ordinance." Id. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397.
39. 437 Pa. 237, 363 A.2d 395 (1970). In Girsh, developers sought to build highrise, luxury apartments. Id. at 239, 363 A.2d at 396. Because the applicable zoning
ordinance did not provide for multi-unit apartment buildings, the developers requested that the tract by rezoned. Id. This request was denied by the township
board of commissioners. Id. The zoning board of adjustment similarly sustained the
ordinance over the developers' constitutional challenge that the ordinance was exclusionary; this rule was affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas for Delaware County.
Id. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the failure of the appellee-township's zoning scheme to provide for apartments was unconstitutional and
reversed the court below. 437 Pa. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398.
40. Id. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396. The zoning ordinance provided for single-family residential uses only and therefore, it did not explicitly prohibit multi-unit apartment dwellings. Id. The Girsh court determined that this amounted to a total
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that a municipal zoning ordinance which failed to provide for apartments
41
was unconstitutional.
This first application of exclusionary zoning principles to a total exclusion of a form of residential use was facilitated by a precedent line of cases in
the commercial zoning area which held that other forms of total exclusion
constituted an illegitimate exercise of the police power. Specifically, the
Girsh court relied on cases declaring invalid zoning ordinances which pro43
hibited quarrying in a township, 42 enacted a total ban on flashing signs,
exclusion of use. For a further discussion of the rationale of the Girsh decision, see
note 41 ihfra.
For an in-depth analysis of the Girsh decision, see Note, Apartments 1n the Suburbs."
In re Appeal of Girsh, 74 DICK. L. REV. 634 (1970). The position taken by this
commentator is that "[t]he Girsh court . . . did not hold that the ordinance was ipso

facto unconstitutional because it failed to provide for apartments, but rather that it
was unconstitutional because it had been adopted with an exclusionary intent." Id. at
649. It is submitted that although this may have been underlying the Girsh opinion,
recent Pennsylvania applications of Girsh indicate that this interpretation of Grsh is
no longer viable. Specifically, zoning ordinances which preclude reasonable multifamily development in areas where developable land exists, have been found unconstitutional if the effect of the ordinance is to prohibit multi-family housing, regardless
of intent. See, e.g., Camp Hill Dev. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commw.
519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974) (commonwealth court interpreted Girsh to mean that an
ordinance which fails to provide for a legitimate and needed residential use is unconstitutional), dzsapproved in, Appeal of M. A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 246 A.2d 107
(1983). Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently articulated a threeprong test to determine whether an allegedly exclusionary ordinance is unconstitutional. See Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Adjustment, 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105
(1978) (in order to determine whether a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional, a court
must look at the following factors: 1) whether the community is a logical place for
development; 2) the present level of development; and 3) whether the challenged
zoning scheme effected an exclusionag result, or alternatively, whether there was an exclusionary intent to zone out population growth) (emphasis added). The last prong
of the Surrck test illustrates that a zoning ordinance may be declared unconstitutional even in the absence of exclusionary intent, where the ordinance results in an
exclusionary effect. For a full discussion of Surrck, see notes 76-87 and accompanying
text itfra.

41. 437 Pa. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
stated that the issue before the court was "whether appellee [township] must provide
for apartment living as part of itsplan of development." Id. at 242, 263 A.2d at 397
(emphasis added). In answering this question, Justice Roberts drew from his opinion

in National Land the basic concept that a township cannot use zoning as a tool to
prevent the entrance of newcomers. Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398. For a discussion of

the exclusionary zoning principles as set forth in NationalLand, see notes 17-28 supra.
Specifically, Justice Roberts stated, "In refusing to allow apartment development as
part of its zoning scheme, appellee has in effect decided to zone out the people who
would be able to live in the Township if apartments were available." 437 Pa. at 242,
263 A.2d at 397 (emphasis added).
It is noted that Justice Roberts made use of the word "apartments" as opposed
to "multi-family" units. For a discussion of the implications created by limiting the
holding of Girsh to apartments, see notes 57-61 and accompanying text tnfra.
42. See Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d
169 (1967) (complete prohibition of quarrying in township in question was not justified by potential problems, must be viewed with particularly circumspection, and
was an unconstitutional use of police power).
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and created a total prohibition on billboards.4 4 Drawing from these total
exclusion of commercial use cases, the Girsh court emphasized that not only
must a land-use restriction be reasonable in order to be constitutionally sustained,4 5 but also "[t]he constitutionality of zoning ordinances which totally
prohibit legitimate businesses . . . from an entire community must be re-

garded with particular circumspection .... ,,46 Based on this standard, the
Girsh court was able to apply the exclusionary zoning principles developed
in NalionalLand to a distinct factual allegation. 4 7 The court was also able to
set new standards which would form the basis for future exclusionary zoning
48
challenges.
In Girsh, as in National Land, Justice Roberts emphasized the exclusionary character of the ordinance by rejecting the township's justifications for
upholding the ordinance, 49 while recognizing the interests of persons desir43. In re Appeal of Ammon R. Smith Auto Co., 423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d 683
(1966) (zoning ordinance which prohibited flashing and intermittent lights on all
signs throughout the township was too general, too broad and unreasonable, and was
invalid as an improper exercise of the township's police power).
44. Norate Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965)
(ordinance purporting to ban all "off-site" billboards throughout the entire township
was patently unreasonable and invalid).
45. 437 Pa. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397.
46. Id. at 242, 263 A.2d at 397 (quoti'zg Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 59, 228 A.2d 169, 179 (1967)). The Girsh majority emphasized this analogy by stating, "Just as we held in Exton Quarrzes, Ammon R. Smith and
Norate that the governing bodies must make some provision for the use in question,
we today follow those cases and hold that appellee cannot have a zoning scheme that
makes no reasonable provision for apartment uses." Id. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398.
47. Id. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396. In Girsh, the zoning ordinance in question was
alleged to be exclusionary because it did not provide for apartment development. Id.
In National Land, the ordinance was alleged to be exclusionary because it required
large minimum lots in approximately 80% of the municipality. 419 Pa. at 508-09,
215 A.2d at 600. For a discussion of the facts in NationalLand, see notes 18-28 and
accompanying text supra. It is submitted that although large-lot zoning and prohibition of apartments are distinct means by which an exclusionary zoning ordinance
may operate, both of these means effect the same basic result of maintaining the low
density nature of the community.
48. 437 Pa. at 243-46, 263 A.2d at 398-99. In concluding, Justice Roberts indicated that an important factor in deciding whether the exclusion was unconstitutional was whether the township itself was a "logical place for development to take
place." Id. at 245, 263 A.2d at 398.
The inquiry into whether the municipality is a "logical place for development"
has been subsequently regarded as the basic premise of the Girsh decision. See Surrick
v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 476 Pa. 182, 189, 382 A.2d 105, 108 (1977) (the Girsh
"premise" requires that where a municipal subdivision "is a logical place for development, it should not be heard to say that it will not bear its rightful part of the burden"). Moreover, this inquiry was adopted as the first prong of the three-part test set
out in Surrick. For a discussion of the Surrick test, see notes 76-87 and accompanying
text, infra.
49. 437 Pa. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396. The township's primary contention was

that apartment development was not expressly prohibited; rather, it was permitted
by means of obtaining a variance. Id. The majority rejected this contention upon
determining that the failure to provide for apartments was a legal equivalent to an
express prohibition. Id. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397. The township then contended that
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ing to move into the municipality. 50 The Girsh court found that the prohibition of apartments resulted in a frustration of natural population growth
into the municipality, 5 1 and held that the municipality "cannot have a zoning scheme that makes no reasonable provision for apartment uses."' 5 2 In
this manner, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the obvious exclusionary effect of freezing population density that is created by a zoning ordi53
nance that prevents apartment development.
The Girsh holding appeared to embody a blanket presumption of unconstitutionality which would thereafter be applied to zoning ordinances
which prevented apartment development. However, before concluding his
opinion, Justice Roberts added that "if Nether Providence is a logical place
for development to take place, it should not be heard to say that it will not
bear its rightful part of the burden."' 54 Although stated in dictum, this conapartment use, causing a significant increase in the population of the municipality,
would result in a strain upon municipal services and "would clash with the existing
residential neighborhood." Id. at 243, 253 A.2d at 398. Quoting from National Land,
Justice Roberts stated that zoning may not be used to avoid expansion of municipal
facilities. Id. In respect to the latter contention, the court reaffirmed its holding in
National Land that the protection of the aesthetic nature of the community was an
insufficient justification for the exclusionary zoning technique. Id.
50. Id. at 242, 263 A.2d at 397 ("appellee has in effect decided to zone out the
people who would be able to live in the Township if apartments were available")
(emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 246, 263 A.2d at 399. The Girsh court stated,
Apartment living is a fact of life that communities like Nether Providence
must learn to accept. If Nether Providence is located so that it is a place
where apartment living is in demand, it must provide for apartments in its
plan for future growth; it cannot close its doors to others seeking a 'reasonable place to live.'
Id.
It is interesting to note that the apartment development in question in the Girsh
decision was not of the type that would provide housing for low or middle-income
families. Id. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396. One commentator has optimistically expressed
that the Girsh doctrine would prove to be a helpful precedent to those seeking to
provide suburban apartment housing to persons of moderate income. Comment,
supra note 40, at 657. Although it is agreed that Girah is helpful, it is suggested that
its impact has been modest: the Girsh decision does not require zoning municipalities
to provide for low and middle-income housing-, nor do later decisions by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court require zoning ordinances to provide for such housing. For
a discussion of later Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions which similarly omit the
proposition that municipalities provide for balanced communities, see notes 68-111
and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania approach to fair
share, which is based on land available for apartment development, see notes 68-87
and accompanying text infra.
52. 437 Pa. at 243, 263 A.2d at 398.
53. Id. at 244, 263 A.2d at 398. Justice Roberts stated that "Nether Providence
may not permissibly choose to only take as many people as can live in single-family
housing, in effect freezing the population at near present levels." Id.
54. Id. at 245, 263 A.2d at 398-99. Justice Roberts added a footnote to support
this proposition:
Perhaps in an ideal world, planning and zoning would be done on a regional
basis, so that a given community would have apartments while an adjoining community would not. But as long as we allow zoning to be done
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cept of a "logical place for development" later served to create a safe harbor
for municipalities that would otherwise fall prey to the Girsh mandate that
zoning ordinances provide for apartment growth. 55 Regardless of this qualification, just as National Land and Concord Township illustrate the Pennsylvania court's strong preference toward small minimum-lot restrictions, the
Girsh case characterizes that court's view of apartment development as a
favored use.

56

This protection afforded to apartment development has been subjected
to much interpretation by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.5 7 Although the narrow holding of Girsh imposed upon municipalities the sole
community by community, it is intolerable to allow one municipality (or
many municipalities) to close its doors at the expense of surrounding communities and the central city.
Id. at 245, n.4, 263 A.2d at 399, n.4 (emphasis added). It is submitted that this footnote, in light of the statement it was intended to support, is illustrative of the lack of
consistency displayed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. This footnote indicates
that because zoning is done community by community, no community should ever
be permitted to close its doors to multi-family development. Cf. Appeal of Elocin,
501 Pa. 438, 461 A.2d 771 (1983) (zoning ordinance not invalid despite failure to
provide for mid- and high-rise apartments).
55. See, e.g., Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 438, 461 A.2d 771 (1983) (zoning
ordinance failing to provide for mid-rise and high-rise apartments was not invalid
where the court determined that the zoning municipality was already substantially
developed and hence not a logical place for future growth and development). For a
discussion of Elocin, see notes 105-11 and accompanying text infra. Without relying
on the Elocin case as precedent, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has similarly
recently held that a zoning municipality which is not a logical place for development
is not required to zone for apartment construction. See Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 76 Pa. Commw. 409, 464 A.2d 587 (1983).
56. See Developments in the Law..-Zontng, supra note 2, at 1639-40. The Gzrsh opinion placed apartments onto a list of favored uses, thereby joining small-lot zoning.
Id. The Pennsylvania creation of a system of favored uses has been criticized, specifically when compared with New Jersey's judicial mandate that a township provide a
fair share of housing for low and moderate income groups. See 1d. In response to the
Girsh opinion, it has been suggested that
[Ilimiting the court's focus to protecting specific uses may not solve underlying aspects of exclusionary practices. . . . Moreover, given the impossibility of directly matching particular uses with specific income groups, a
mixture of uses creating an environment of suburban heterogeneity seems
best suited to achieving open communities.
Id. at 1640.
57. See, e.g., Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commw. 514, 338 A.2d 748 (1975) (relying
on Girsh, court held that townhouses must be provided for as a reasonable, legitimate
and recognized use), disapprovedin, M. A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa., 460 A.2d 1075 (1983);
Camp Hill Dev. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commw. 519, 319 A.2d 197
(1974) (ordinance prohibiting townhouse construction was unconstitutional as unreasonably failing to provide for a legitimate and needed residential use), disapproved in,
Appeal of M. A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983).
The Girsh decision has been most commonly utilized by the commonwealth
court to require that a municipality provide for townhouse development. However,
some courts have interpreted the Girsh holding to indicate that a zoning municipality
may have to provide for less traditional types of multi-family uses as well, as long as
the use is reasonable. See Kaufman and Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Pa.
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491

requirement that they zone for apartments, 5 8 numerous Pennsylvania lower
courts have utilized the Girsh decision to require that municipalities provide
for different types of reasonable multi-family residential uses. 5 9 The commonwealth court generally has held that a Pennsylvania zoning ordinance
which excludes townhouse development is invalid. 60 The usefulness of the
total exclusion line of cases has been substantially curtailed by recent decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in which the court resolved that a
failure to provide for a particular use did not give rise to a constitutional
violation where the zoning municipality was not a logical place for growth
61
and development.
C.

Regionahsm: Impostg a Fair Share Obhgation

Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously announced
Commw. 116, 340 A.2d 989 (1975), modied, 31 Pa. Commw. 315, 376 A.2d 305
(1977) (fourplex unit may be entitled to same protection as that afforded
apartments).
The commonwealth court has most recently held that a zoning ordinance which
effectively excludes all multi-family development is not subject to the mandate of
Girsh where the municipality is not a logical place for development. See Fernley v.
Board of Supervisors, 76 Pa. Commw. 409, 464 A.2d 587 (1983). Hence, it is submitted that although the commonwealth court had in the past appeared to be less deferential to zoning communities wishing to avoid population expansion, the Fernley case
indicates that the lower courts may not be willing to allow a developer to construct
apartments in established suburbs.
58. Girsh, 437 Pa. at 240, 263 A.2d at 396. For a discussion of the Girsh mandate
that zoning municipalities provide for apartment development, see notes 41 & 51-53
and accompanying text supra.
59. See note 57 supra.
60. R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 259. See,e.g., 19 Pa. Commw. 514, 338 A.2d
748 (1975) (zoning ordinances must provide for townhouses); Westrum Enter. v.
Board of Comm'rs, 21 Pa. Commw. 51, 343 A.2d 685 (1975) (zoning ordinance unconstitutional because it expressly excluded row houses from its definition of multiple
dwellings and failed to provide for townhouse development anywhere in the township); Camp Hill Dev. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commw. 519, 319
A.2d 197 (1974) (ordinance prohibiting townhouse construction was unconstitutional
as unreasonably failing to provide for a legitimate and needed residential use). Cf
Dublin Properties v. Board of Comm'rs, 21 Pa. Commw. 54, 342 A.2d 821 (1975)
(zoning ordinance which failed to provide for townhouse development anywhere in
the township was unconstitutional). But see Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 76 Pa.
Commw. 409, 464 A.2d 587 (1983) (ordinance which flatly prohibited multiple
dwellings found constitutional). For a discussion of the potential impact of the Fern/ey decision on townhouse development, see note 61 and accompanying text 1hfra.
61. See Appeal of M. A. Kravitz Co., Inc., 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983)
(failure of zoning ordinance to affirmatively provide for townhouse development did
not render ordinance unconstitutional where the municipality was not a logical place
for growth and development); Appeal of Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 347, 461 A.2d 773
(1983) (failure to provide for particular multi-family uses did not render ordinance
unconstitutional where the municipality was not already substantially developed).
For a discussion of Kravitz and Eloacm, see notes 89-111 and accompanying text thfra.
The reasoning in Kravitz and Elocbh, that community which is not a logical place for
development need not provide for a particular use, has been utilized by the commonwealth court to allow such communities to expressly exclude particular uses. See
Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 76 Pa. Commw. 409, 464 A.2d 587 (1983).
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principles that were specifically tailored to mitigate against the exclusionary
62
effects of either large-lot zoning or total exclusion of use zoning, recent
decisions indicate that these earlier modes of analysis have been abandoned
63
The key to this unified doctrine
and a more unified doctrine has emerged.
64
This new mode of judicial analysis recognizes the broad
is regionalism.
extra-territorial impact of a zoning ordinance and generally requires that a
zoning municipality provide housing for a fair share of development and
population expansion. 65 Where prior cases utilized the concept of regionalism as but one facet of their analysis, 66 the current Pennsylvania decisions
illustrate that "regionalism" has itself developed into an analytical device to
determine whether an ordinance is exclusionary and therefore
67
unconstitutional.
62. See notes 9-13 and accompanying text supra.
63. See, e.g., Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 76 Pa. Commw. 409, 464 A.2d 587,

589 (1983). Judge Craig, writing for the Fernley court, observed that "the fair share
analysis most certainly embraces total exclusion and is not to be used apart from total
exclusion cases, that is, only in partial exclusion cases." Id. For an illustration of the
distinction between total and partial exclusion, also known as "tokenism," compare
discussion of Girsh at notes 38-53 and accompanying text supra, with the discussion of
Township of Willitown v. ChesterdaleFarms at notes 68-75 and accompanying text infra.
64. See Developments ii the Lawt.--Zoning, supra note 2, at 1636. The judicial principle of regionalism provides that a "locality is liable if it fails to provide for its fair
share of the regional housing need." Id. at 1640. The Pennsylvania and New Jersey
courts are not in concert in their application of the concept of regionalism. For a
discussion of the Pennsylvania courts' application of regionalism as compared with
the application of regionalism by the New Jersey courts, see note 86 thfra.
65. The "fair share" principle was first enunciated in Mount Laurel!, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975). In finding a suburban zoning ordinance invalid, the New
Jersey Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a developing municipality
could establish a system of land-use regulation which made it physically and economically impossible to provide low and moderate income housing within the municipality. Id. at 173, 336 A.2d at 724. The Mt. Laurel I majority concluded that "every
such municipality must, by its land use regulations, presumptively make realistically
possible an appropriate variety and choice of housing. More specifically, presumptively it cannot foreclose the opportunity . . . at least to the extent of the municipality'sfairshare of the present and prospective regional need therefor." Id. at 184, 336
A.2d at 724 (emphasis added). For a comparison of the New Jersey fair share approach with the Pennsylvania fair share approach, see note 86 bhfra.
66. See NationalLand, 419 Pa. at 532, 215 A.2d at 612 ("zoning ordinance whose
primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers. . . cannot be held valid").
See also Concord Township, 439 Pa. at 474, 268 A.2d at 768-69 ("[i]t is not for any given
township to say who may or may not live within its confines, while disregarding the
interests of the entire area"); Girsh, 438 Pa. at 242, 253 A.2d at 397 ("[t]he question
posed is whether the township can stand in the way of natural forces which send our
growing population into hitherto undeveloped areas in search of a comfortable place
to live").
67. See, e.g., Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105, 105
(1977) (creating a three-prong fair share test under which a partial exclusion of
apartments was unconstitutional); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms,
Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975) (employing a fair share approach to invalidate
a zoning ordinance which provided only a token allotment of acreage for apartment

development).
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Township of Wi/istown v.Chesterdale Farms, Inc. 68 was the first Pennsylvania Supreme Court case that attempted to invoke regionalism as an
operative standard for determining whether an ordinance was exclusionary. 69 In Wiihstown, a plurality of the court was faced with the issue of
whether a zoning ordinance that provided less than one percent 70 of its total
acreage for apartment-type dwellings was exclusionary. 7 I The court cited to
both Appeal of Girsh and National Land, and reasoned that because a zoning
ordinance must be reasonable and its primary purpose must not be to prevent the entrance of newcomers into the municipality, 72 the ordinance in
question was " 'exclusionary' in that it [did] not provide for a fair share of
the township acreage for apartment construction." 73 Thus, Wilistown illus68. 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975). In Wi//istown, the developer desired to
construct apartments on a tract of land that was zoned for single-family residential
use. Id. at 447, 341 A.2d at 467. The developers' proposal was rejected by the township. Id. Shortly after the Girsh decision, the developers again applied for a building
permit and additionally filed an action in mandamus alleging that in light of Girsh,
the ordinance was unconstitutional. Id. While the township subsequently rezoned 80
acres to allow apartments to be built, the tract owned by the developers was not
within the rezoned area. Id. Consequently, the developers request for a building
permit was denied by the zoning hearing board. Id. The developers appealed to the
Court of Common Pleas for Chester County, which upheld the zoning board's decision but declared the new ordinance unconstitutional. Id. Both parties sought allocatur, which was granted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id. at 447-48, 341
A.2d at 467.
69. Id. at 447-50, 341 A.2d at 467-69. Justice O'Brien, writing for the court, was
joined by Justice Eagen and Justice Nix. See id. The plurality found that the zoning
ordinance in question was exclusionary because it did not provide for a fair share of
apartment construction. Id. at 449-50, 341 A.2d at 468. Justice Manderino concurred in the result. Id. at 451, 341 A.2d 469 (Manderino, J., concurring). Justice
Roberts also concurred, filing a separate opinion. Id. at 454, 341 A.2d at 471 (Roberts, J., concurring). The sole dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Pomeroy. Id. at
451, 341 A.2d at 469 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Jones did not participate in the consideration of the decision. Id. at 450, 341 A.2d at 469.
70. Id. at 448, 341 A.2d at 467. At the time the suit was instituted, only 80 of
11,589 acres in the township were available for apartment development. Id.
71. Id. Both the developer and the township based their arguments on the Girsh
decision, which had held that a zoning ordinance that did not provide for apartment
development anywhere within the zoning municipality was exclusionary. For a dis-

cussion of Girsh, see notes 38-56 and accompanying text supra. In Wdlistown, the
township argued that because the ordinance provided for an 80-acre site upon which

apartments could be built, the ordinance met the Girsh mandate. 462 Pa. at 448, 341
A.2d at 467. In contrast, the developer contended that the rezoning of only 80 acres
out of 11,589 acres in the township constituted "tokenism" and was an exclusionary
land-use restriction within the reasoning of Girsh. Id.
72. See Girsh, 437 Pa. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397 ("[t]o be constitutionally sustained,
the appellee's land-use restriction must be reasonable"); NationalLand, 419 Pa. at 532,
215 A.2d at 612 ("a zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon
the administration of public services and facilities can not be held valid").
73. 462 Pa. at 450, 341 A.2d at 468. The Wdhstown plurality quoted the following language from Concord Township:
The implication of our decision in National Land.

.

.is that communities

must deal with the problems of population growth. They may not refuse to
confront the future by adopting zoning regulations that effectively restrict
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trates that, even where there is not a total exclusion of apartment development,7 4 a zoning ordinance may nonetheless be deemed exclusionary if the
zoning provision sets an amount of acreage for apartment development
75
which does not consitute a fair share of the regional demand.
Two years later, in Surri4c v. Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Providence
Township ,76 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave majority approval to the

fair share approach articulated by the Wilh'sown plurality. 77 Although Justice Nix, writing for the Surrick majority, purported to establish a new threeprong "analytical matrix," this approach did not effect a significant deparpopulation to near present levels. . . . It is not for any given township to
say who may and who may not live within its confines, while disregarding
the interests of the entire area.
d. at 449, 341 A.2d at 468 (quoting Concord Township Appeal, 439 Pa. at 474, 268 A.2d
at 768-69 (footnotes and citations omitted)).
74. 462 Pa. at 448, 341 A.2d at 466. Because the township had rezoned 80 acres
for apartment development, the ordinance no longer amounted to a total exclusion.
Id. However, the Willistown plurality concluded that "the prevention of 'newcomers'
is not limited to total exclusion, but also selective admission." Id. at 449, 341 A.2d at
468 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 449-50, 341 A.2d at 468. The Wilistown court stated:
Our review of the record convinces us that the township zoning ordinance
which provides for apartment construction in only 80 out of a total 11,589
acres in the township continues to be 'exclusionary' in that it does not provide for a fair share of the township acreage for apartment construction.
Id. (emphasis added). It is noted that the only affirmative obligation placed upon the
zoning municipality was to set aside a fair share of township acreage for apartment
development. See id. Cf.M. Laurell, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (zoning municipality under obligation to provide an opportunity for low and moderate income
housing).
76. 476 Pa. 182, 382 A.2d 105 (1977). In Surrick, a landowner sought to build
both apartments and townhouses on a tract located in an area which was zoned to
permit only single-family dwellings on one-acre lots. Id. at 186, 382 A.2d at 106.
After his request for rezoning of the tract was denied, the landowner appealed to the
board of adjustment requesting a variance and challenging the constitutionality of
the ordinance. Id. at 186, 382 A.2d at 107. The zoning ordinance in question designated only 1.14% of total township acreage for apartment development. Id. at 187,
382 A.2d at 107. The area designated for apartment development also permitted
commercial uses and was found to be already substantially developed. Id. The
board denied the landowner's request, and the landowner subsequently appealed to
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Id. at 186, 382 A.2d at 107. For an in-depth
discussion of Surrick, see Note, Zoning-Constitutionah'ty of Exclusionagy Zoning Ordinance-FairShares 17 DuQ. L. REV. 507 (1979).
77. 476 Pa. at 196, 382 A.2d at 112. Justice Nix wrote the majority opinion in
which Justices Eagen and O'Brien joined. Id. at 185, 382 A.2d at 106. Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 198, 382 A.2d at 114 (Roberts, J., concurring).
Justice Manderino concurred in the result. Id. at 196, 382 A.2d at 112 (Manderino,
J., concurring). Justice Nix, writing for the Surrick majority, concluded by stating
that the court's analysis led
inescapably to the conclusion that the facts of the instant case are legally
indistinguishable from those in Willisown. Thus we hold that Upper Providence Township has not provided a 'fair share' of its land for development
of multi-family dwellings.
Id. at 195-96, 382 A.2d at 112 (footnote omitted).
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78
ture from prior Pennsylvania zoning law.

In Surrck, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was again faced with the
issue of whether a zoning ordinance which effected a partial exclusion of
apartments was invalid. 79 In finding that the zoning ordinance was exclusionary, the court implemented a fair share analysis8 0 which required a cumulative determination of three separate issues: 1) whether the community
is in the path of urban-suburban growth; 81 2) whether the particular community is already highly developed; 8 2 and 3) whether the challenged zoning
scheme causes an exclusionary result. 8 3 This mode of analysis, although
78. See Note, supra note 77, at 514 (commenting that Surrtck is a mere reiteration
of the standards set forth in prior Pennsylvania cases, and thus does not alter Pennsylvania's constitutional analysis of zoning ordinances). It has been suggested that
each of the three prongs of the Surrck test can be traced to language of earlier Pennsylvania decisions. See id. For example, the first prong of the Surrick test requires
consideration of whether the community is in the path of urban-suburban growth.
476 Pa. at 192, 382 A.2d at 110. This inquiry contemplates the same issue raised by
Justice Roberts in Girsh when he stated that if the township in Girsh was a "logical
place for development," then it could not assert that it should not bear its rightful
part of the regional burden. See Girsh, 437 Pa. at 245, 263 A.2d at 398-99.
79. 476 Pa. at 187, 382 A.2d at 111. The zoning ordinance for Upper Providence Township provided 1.14% of the township land for multi-family development.
Id. This issue was therefore similar to the issue decided in Wihitown, where 80 acres
of 11,586 total township acres permitted development of multi-family dwellings. For
a discussion of Wi//istown, see notes 68-75 and accompanying text supra.
80. 476 Pa. at 189, 382 A.2d at 108. Justice Nix defined "fair share" as a principle which "requires local political units to plan for and provide land-use regulations
which meet the legitnateneeds of all categories ofpeople who may desire to live within its

boundaries." Id. (emphasis added). This definition is particularly interesting in light
of the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never required that a zoning
ordinance provide for low and middle income housing. See Surrick, 476 Pa. 182, 382
A.2d 105 (zoning ordinance which did not provide a fair share of land for development of multi-family dwellings was unconstitutionally exclusionary); Girsh, 438 Pa.
237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (zoning ordinance must provide for apartment development somewhere within the municipality); WIiisown, 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466
(1975) (plurality opinion) (zoning ordinance must provide for a fair share of apartment development). Cf. Mt. Laurell, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975) (zoning ordinance must provide a fair share of moderate and low income housing).
81. 476 Pa. at 192, 382 A.2d at 110. Specifically, the court stated, "The initial
inquiry must focus upon whether the community in question is a logical area for
development and population growth." Id.
82. Id. Justice Nix set forth the second prong of his analytical matrix to be the
"present level of development within the particular community," and listed three
factors which he perceived to be "highly relevant" to that determination: 1) the
population density rate; 2) the percentage of total undeveloped land; and 3) the percentage available for the development of multi-family dwellings. Id.
It is submitted that the identification of the last of the three factors sheds uncertainty upon the Surrick holding. It is questioned whether the 1.14% of land was not
sufficient to constitute a fair share, or alternatively, whether the 1.14% was not a
satisfactory allocation because the land was already highly developed.
83. Id. at 192-93, 382 A.2d at 110-11. The Surrick court noted that although
prior cases had focused on whether there was an exclusionary intent, it was their
opinion that in light of Wi//s/own, evidence of exclusionary motive was not of critical
importance. Id. at 193, 382 A.2d at 110. Rather, the Surrick court stated, "Wi /istown
marked an implicit departure away from judicial inquiry into the motives underlying
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novel in its express application, is a culmination of previously-recognized
factors considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in applying a substantive due process analysis. 8 4 Hence, although the seriated analysis was
new to the court,8 5 and was clothed in a more popular name,8 6 the Surrnc4
87
test does not represent a significant change in Pennsylvania zoning law.
a particular zoning ordinance. Our primary concern now is centered upon an ordinance's exclusionary impact." Id. at 193, 382 A.2d at 110-11 (footnotes omitted). In
considering the effect of an alleged exclusion, Justice Nix stated that the extent of the
exclusion must be considered. Id. at 194, 382 A.2d at 111. Specifically, this inquiry
becomes a determination of whether there is a total exclusion of multi-family dwellings-which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disapproved in Girsh Appeal-or, alternatively, whether the exclusion ispartial. Id. In response, Justice Nix stated that
where the amount of land zoned for multi-family dwellings is disproportionately
small in relation to population growth pressure, the current level of population, and
the amount of undeveloped land in the community, then the ordinance will be held
to be exclusionary. Id.
84. Id. at 188-89, 382 A.2d at 108. Seealso Note,supra note 77, at 510 ("test used
by the supreme court [in Surrick] to determine whether a zoning ordinance offends
the Constitution of the United States or Pennsylvania was a substantive due process
test").
85. 476 Pa. at 192, 382 A.2d at 110 ("[qrom this body of law a useful analytical
matrix can be synthesized to aid our review").
86. Two years prior to the Wilh'iown case, the New Jersey Supreme Court
coined the phrase "fair share." See Mi. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. 151, 337 A.2d 713 (1975).
The Willistown plurality chose to utilize this term in its analysis. See notes 74-75 and
accompanying text supra. The Pennsylvania court gave majority approval to the
term "fair share" in Sumck. See notes 76 & 77 and accompanying text supra.
The term "fair share" has enjoyed considerable popularity, and although it connotes the concepts of regionalism in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the affirmative duty placed on zoning municipalities is notably different in the two states. See
notes 7, 8 & 75 supra. Specifically, the New Jersey "fair share" obligation mandates
that a zoning ordinance provide a fair share of low and middle-income housing,
whereas the Pennsylvania "fair share" obligation merely requires that the township
provide a fair share of acreage for apartment development. See note 75 supra. It is
submitted, therefore, that a Pennsylvania township could meet its fair share obligation if it provided for a reasonable number of luxury apartments, even if those apartments were well outside the financial means of low and middle income persons.
Thus, the Pennsylvania courts have in effect applied the New Jersey principle of "fair
share" in name, but not in spirit. For a discussion of the New Jersey fair-share standard, see note 2 supra.
This conceptual difference is also reflected in terms of standing: unlike New
Jersey, Pennsylvania law does not permit non-residents to challenge zoning provisions. See note 27 supra. Although the Pennsylvania court has not acted on this distinction to require municipalities to zone for all economic classes, there are
indications that the Pennsylvania court is aware of this distinction. See Sumk, 476
Pa. at 193, n.10, 382 A.2d at 110, n.10 ("it should be noted that the decisions of this
court which have struck down zoning schemes have focused the analysis upon the
restriction on or exclusion of uses, not on the exclusion of certain classes of people")
(emphasis added).
87. See Note, supra note 77, at 515 (the Surrick analytical method does not represent a new test, but rather a refinement of the traditional substantive due process
test).
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THE RECENT DECISIONS: IMPLEMENTATION OF SURRICK, AND
DOES GIRSH SURVIVE?

After a six-year hiatus in the resolution of exclusionary zoning issues,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was recently confronted with a new aspect of exclusionary zoning: whether a township that does not stand in the
path of development, or, alternatively, is already substantially developed,
may validly preclude the development of multi-family dwellings where the
88
township does not contain a fair share of acreage for multi-family housing.
In Appeal of M. A. Kravitz, Inc. ,89 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was

faced with the specific issue of whether the Wrightstown Township zoning
ordinance, which failed to provide for townhouse development, could nonetheless be constitutional. 90 In considering this issue, the court was faced with
a township which had zoned only .6% of the total acreage for multi-family
92
housing. 9 ' In reversing the lower court's invalidation of the ordinance,
Justice Zappala, writing for the plurality of the court, concluded that neither
88. Appeal of M. A. Kravtz Co., Inc., 501 Pa. at 200, 460 A.2d at 1075; Appeal of

Elocin, Inc., 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983). For a discussion of the Kravitz and
Elocin decisions, see notes 89-111 and accompanying text itfra.
89. 501 Pa. 200, 460 A.2d 1075 (1983). On May 7, 1976, the M. A. Kravitz Co.
petitioned the zoning board for Wrightstown Township for a curative amendment to
the zoning ordinance and approval of a proposed townhouse development on a 96acre tract of land. Id. at 503, 460 A.2d at 1077. The tract owned by the developer
was zoned to permit only single-family residences. Id. The developer argued to the
board that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it totally excluded townhouses, and, alternatively, that even if the ordinance did not totally exclude
townhouse development, it resulted in a defacto exclusion because it made only token
provision for such development. Id. Upon its finding that the ordinance permitted
multi-family dwellings and that the township provided a "fair share" of population
growth, the Board of Supervisors of Wrightstown Township denied the amendment.
Id. The court of common pleas, without taking additional evidence, affirmed the
board's decision. Id. On appeal, the commonwealth court reversed and directed that
the proposed development be given approval. M. A. Kravitz Co., Inc. Appeal, 53 Pa.
Commw. 622, 419 A.2d 227 (1980), rev'd, Appeal of M. A. Kravitz Co., 501 Pa. 200,
460 A.2d 1075 (1983). In support of its ruling, the commonwealth court cited a line
of its own decisions which had held that an ordinance which prohibits or reasonably
fails to provide for townhouses was unconstitutional. Id. For a discussion of commonwealth court decisions requiring a zoning municipality to provide the same protection to townhouses as it must for apartment development, see notes 57-61 and
accompanying text supra.
90. 501 Pa. at 211, 460 A.2d at 1081 ("[t]he question which this case presents is
whether a community must affirmatively provide for a particular architectural design in its plan for development"). The Kravitz court, in its analysis, drew a distinction between a prohibition of uses and failure to provide for uses. Id. In its discussion
of this distinction, the court concluded that although a township may not totally
prohibit certain uses, an ordinance will not be found unreasonable solely because it
failed to provide for a particular use. Id. The Wrightstown ordinance did not expressly prohibit townhouses and defined this use in its definitional section. Id. at 703,
n.I, 460 A.2d at 1077, n.1. Thus, even though the board had conceded that no
separate townhouse district was established by the zoning ordinance, this failure to
provide did not render the ordinance exclusionary. Id. at 211, 460 A.2d at 1081.
91. Id. at 214, 460 A.2d at 1083. Out of a total township area of 6,491 acres,
only 40 acres were zoned for multi-family housing. Id. The appellant argued that
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the failure to provide for townhouses nor the notably small percentage of
acreage zoned for multi-family development rendered the ordinance uncon93
stitutionally exclusionary.
The Kravilz court first addressed the zoning ordinance's failure to provide for townhouses. 94 Despite the commonwealth court's repeated utilization of the Girsh decision in order to require townhouse development, 95 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court firmly concluded that the Gi'rsh mandate was
"explicitly limited to the facts peculiar to that case." 96 Justice Zappala reasoned that because the township in Girsh had failed to provide for any type
of multi-family housing, this failure "operated to exclude population growth,
an impermissible result under the National Land rationale. ' 97 While the
commonwealth court had construed Girsh to mandate that ordinances which
failed to provide for legitimate multi-family uses were per se unconstitutional, 98 Justice Zappala interpreted Girsh to state that municipalities may
this amounted to "tokenism," similar to that found by the court in Wilhlown. Id.
For a discussion of Wi/istown, see notes 68-75 and accompanying text, supra.
92. See M. A. Kravitz, Inc. Appeal, 53 Pa. Commw. 622, 419 A.2d 227 (1980).
The commonwealth court concluded that the township ordinance failed to provide
for townhouse development. Id. at 627, 419 A.2d at 230. The court reasoned that
although the ordinance specifically provided for "Single-Family Attached Dwellings
(Townhouses)," the multi-family district did not contemplate such development. Id.
President Judge Crumlish granted relief for the developer by relying on prior commonwealth court decisions which had held that ordinances which prohibit townhouses throughout the entire municipality were unconstitutional. Id. at 625-28, 419
A.2d at 229-30. See,e.g., Appeal of Olson, 19 Pa. Commw. 514, 338 A.2d 748 (1975);
Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975); Camp Hill
Dev. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commw. 519, 319 A.2d 197 (1974).
For a discussion of the commonwealth court's treatment of townhouses, see note 60
and accompanying text supra.
93. 501 Pa. at 216, 460 A.2d at 1082-83. Justice Flaherty concurred in the result
reached by the plurality. Id., 460 A.2d at 1083 (Flaherty, J., concurring). Justice Nix
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Larsen joined. Id., 460 A.2d at 1084 (Nix,
J., dissenting). Justice Hutchinson filed a dissenting opinion. Id. (Hutchinson, J.,
dissenting).
94. 501 Pa. at 205, 460 A.2d at 1078-80. For a discussion of the distinction
between a failure to provide for certain use, and a total prohibition of uses, see note
90 supra.
95. For a discussion of the application of the Girsh decision to townhouse development, see note 60 and accompanying text supra.
96. 501 Pa. at 206, 460 A.2d at 1079. Justice Zappala arrived at this limitation
to the applicability of Girsh by citing to, and emphasizing, specific language in the
Girsh decision. Id. Justice Zappala, in reviewing Justice Roberts' opinion in Girsh,
wrote,
[Justice Roberts] then observed that at leastfor purposes of this case, the failure
to provide for apartments anywhere within the Township must be viewed
as the legal equivalent of an explicit prohibition of apartment houses in the
zoning ordinance.
d. (emphasis supplied by Justice Zappala). For a further discussion of Girsh, see
notes 38-56 and accompanying text supra.
97. Id. at 208, 461 A.2d at 1079.
98. For a discussion of the commonwealth court's interpretation of Girsh at the
time Kravitz was resolved by the supreme court, see notes 57-61 and accompanying
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not frustrate population expansion by means of their zoning ordinances.
Hence, under Justice Zappala's reading of Girsh, the Wrightstown zoning
ordinance in Kravitz was not deemed exclusionary because it failed to specifically provide for townhouse development, since it did not have the effect of
frustrating development. 0 0

text supra. But see Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 76 Pa. Commw. 409, 464 A.2d 587
(1983) (while expressly distinguishing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in
Kravitz, determining that a zoning ordinance could totally prohibit apartments
where the municipality was not a logical area for growth and development).
99. 501 Pa. at 211, 460 A.2d at 1079-80. It is submitted that Justice Zappala's
reading of Girsh is not fully consistent with the Girsh decision itself, nor with exclusionary zoning principles set forth in supreme court precedent. For example, in concluding his analysis in Girsh, Justice Zappala stated that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has "implicitly acknowledged the primary position which the population issue
occupie[s], subordinating the question of particular uses." Id. at 209, 460 A.2d at
1080. It is submitted that this proposition is untenable since Pennsylvania zoning
law is premised upon "use" exclusion, rather than "class exclusion." See Surrick, 476
Pa. at 193 n. 10, 382 A.2d at 110, n. 10. Justice Nix, writing for the Surrick court,
added that "the decisions of this Court which have struck down zoning schemes have
focused the analysis upon the restriction on or exclusion of certain uses, not on the
exclusion of certain classes of people." Id. For example, the only relief ever granted
by a Pennsylvania court in an exclusionary zoning challenge has been site-specific
relief, that is permitting the landowner/developer to construct the previously prohibited use. Hyson, supra note 2, at 332-34. See, e.g. ,Surrirk, 476 Pa. at 196, 382 A.2d at
12 (in finding that the township had not provided a fair share of its land for multifamily dwellings, the court directed that "zoning approval for appellant's land be
granted and that a zoning permit be issued"). It is submitted that the notion of sitespecific relief reflects the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's preference toward resolving
exclusionary zoning problems on a "use" basis, rather than outwardly confronting
the population expansion problem, as suggested by Justice Zappala.
Moreover, specific language in Girsh indicates that the Girsh court intended its
holding to afford protection to apartments as a legitimate type of land use: "Apartment living is a fact of life that communities like Nether Providence must learn to
accept. If Nether Providence is located so that it is a place where apartment living is
263
in demand, it must provide for apartments in its plan for future growth .......
Pa. at 246, 263 A.2d at 399.
100. 501 Pa. at 208-11, 460 A.2d at 1080-83. The Kravitz plurality drew a distinction between ordinances that fail to provide for a specific use and ordinances that
prohibit a specific use. Id. at 210-11, 460 A.2d at 1081. For an additional discussion
of this distinction, see note 90 supra. This distinction is surprising in light of language
in the Girsh opinion stating that a failure to provide is, in effect, a total prohibition.
See Girtsh, 437 Pa. at 241, 263 A.2d at 397 ("[a]t least for purposes of this case, the
failure to provide for apartments anywhere within the area must be viewed as the
legal equivalent of an explicit prohibition of apartment houses in the zoning ordinance").
Recently, the commonwealth court incorrectly applied this prohibition/failureto-provide distinction in this area. See Fernley v. Board of Supervisors, 76 Pa.
Commw. 409, 464 A.2d 587 (1983). In Fernley, the commonwealth court found that
the Schuylkill Township zoning ordinance flatly prohibited multiple dwellings. Id.
at 411, 464 A.2d at 588. The Kravitz decision suggested that in the case of a total
prohibition, the Exton Quarries rationale would be applicable. Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 21011, 460 A.2d at 1075 ("Whether a community could permissablyprohubit a given use
• . . is a question which is not presented in this case. We suspect that the Exton
Quarries rationale standing alone might control that question") (emphasis supplied).
However, Justice Craig, writing for the commonwealth court in Fernley, nevertheless
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The Kravitz court then turned to the issue of whether the Wrightstown
ordinance was rendered exclusionary because it provided for less than one
10 1
To repercent of the township's acreage for multi-family development.
solve this issue, the Kravitz plurality applied the fair share test as articulated
10 2
The plurality summarily dismissed the contention that the
in Surrzck.
township did not provide a fair share of multi-family dwellings under the
first inquiry of the Surr'c test.' 0 3 Specifically, the Kravitz court found that
the township was "not a logical place for rapid growth and development." 10 4 Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that
the zoning ordinance was valid.
In addition to providing a safe-harbor for communities that do not lie
in the path of future development, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Appeal of Eloctn, Inc. 105 similarly utilized the Surrck analysis to absolve substanapplied the first prong of the Surrick test and found that the area was not a logical
place for development.

76 Pa. Commw. at 414, 464 A.2d at 590.

101. 501 Pa. at 214-15, 460 A.2d at 1082-83.
102. id. For a discussion of the Surrick fair share test, see notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
103. 501 Pa. at 214-15, 460 A.2d at 1082-83. The initial factor in the Surrck

analysis considers whether the community in question is in the path of urban-suburban growth. Id.
104. Id. The Kravitz court concluded that the local board had properly determined that the township was not a logical area for future development after it scrutinized the following factors: the distance between Wrightstown Township and major
metropolitan areas, the lack of highway linkages and mass transportation, and the
projected population growth. Id.
105. 501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983). In Elocin, the developer proposed to
construct both townhouses and mid- or high-rise apartments on a tract of land which
was zoned to permit only single-family detached residences. Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at
772. The Board of Commissioners of Springfield Township denied the developer's
curative amendments. Id. This decision was upheld by the Court of Common Pleas
of Delaware County. Id. The commonwealth court reversed, holding that the zoning ordinance was invalid and remanded the case for reconsideration of Elocin's development proposal. 66 Pa. Commw. 28, 443 A.2d 1333, rev'd, Appeal of Elocin, Inc.,
501 Pa. 348, 461 A.2d 771 (1983). On appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
the township sought reinstatement of the order of the court of common pleas, and the
developer sought definitive relief without the necessity of a remand. 501 Pa. at 350,
461 A.2d at 772. At the time suit was instituted in the supreme court, the Springfield
zoning ordinance made no provision for townhouses or mid- or high-rise apartments,
although other types of multi-family uses were permitted in districts other than that
in which the Elocin tract was located. Id. The commonwealth court had noted that
a great number of these multi-family uses were twin-houses, which existed only as
non-conforming uses. However, this fact escaped the notice of the plurality of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. See 66 Pa. Commw. at 36-37, 443 A.2d at 1338. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court nonetheless acknowledged that 12% of the housing
units were multi-family dwellings and that 4% of the total township acreage remained undeveloped. 501 Pa. at 331, 461 A.2d at 772.
Moreover, it is submitted that the Elocin decision should be considered only for
the supreme court's determination that a substantially-developed community is relieved from providing additional multi-family housing, and not for its analysis of

what constitutes a fair share. Elocin breaks with traditional Pennsylvania analysis of
what "share" is allocated to a particular use by looking not at the ratio of acres zoned
for a particular use to the total number of acres, but rather at the ratio of housing unds

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss2/4

24

Melamut: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the Exclusionary Zoning Dilemm
1983-84]

NOTE

501

tially-developed communities from a duty to provide additional multifamily housing. 10 6
Decided contemporaneously with Kravitz, Elocin
presented the supreme court with the issue of whether a community that is
already substantially developed may validly preclude the construction of
apartment buildings and townhouses.10 7 Relying on its decision in Kravztz,
the court found that the failure to provide for the specific use of townhouses
and mid-rise apartments did not render the zoning ordinance per se invalid.10 8 Moreover, in a straightforward utilization of the Surrick analytical
matrix, 10 9 the Elocin plurality upheld the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance, finding that "the refusal to allow the proposed development [was]
of a particular type to the total number of housing units. See 501 Pa. at 356, 461
A.2d at 771. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has repeatedly defined the fair share
obligation to require that municipalities provide a fair share of total township acreage for multi-family development. Surrick, 476 Pa. at 196, 382 A.2d at 112; Wiistown, 462 Pa. at 450, 341 A.2d at 468. However, it is observed that unlike prior
exclusionary zoning decisions decided on fair share grounds, the Elocin court did not
provide information concerning the total township acreage which permitted multifamily development. Id. at 351-53, 461 A.2d at 772-74. Cf. Kravitz, 501 Pa. at 200,
460 A.2d at 1075 (40 acres out of a total township area of 6,491 acres permitting
multi-family development); Surnck, 476 Pa. at 187, 382 A.2d at 107 (1.14% of total
township acreage was designated as permitting apartment use); WiIstown, 462 Pa. at
448, 341 A.2d at 467 (80 acres out of total 11,589 acres-or less than one percentwas rezoned to permit apartment development).
106. 501 Pa. at 353, 461 A.2d at 773. Such an extension of the first prong of the
Surrick test was predictable in light of Justice Nix's Surrck footnote which elaborated
on his discussion of whether a community is in the path of urban-suburban growth:
Analytically, the present level of community development could be included under the initial inquiry as to whether a community was a logical
area for population growth and development. Commentators have noted,
and probably correctly so, that a particular community might lie along a
corridor of population expansion but already be so highly developed that it
cannot properly be called a "developing" community.
476 Pa. at 192 n.9, 382 A.2d at 110 n.9.
107. 501 Pa. at 352, 461 A.2d at 772. But see Appeal of Silver, 35 Pa. Commw.
569, 387 A.2d 169 (1978). Five years prior to the supreme court's Elocin opinion, the
commonwealth court was confronted with the question of whether a developed community could deny a curative amendment to permit the construction of multi-family
residences. Id. at 570-71, 387 A.2d at 170. The commonwealth court applied Surrick
and first inquired whether the community was a logical area for development. Id. at
572, 387 A.2d at 171. At the time the suit was instituted, the portion of land upon
which multi-family units could be developed constituted only 3.5% of the total acreage. Id. Although the ordinance was found non-exclusionary on other grounds, the
Silver opinion is noteworthy because the Court premised its holding on 100% development capacity, thereby indicating in its opinion that unless a community is 100%
developed, it is not "fully" developed. Id. at 574, 387 A.2d at 172.
108. Id. at 353, 481 A.2d at 773. The Eloczn court, through Justice Zappala,
stated, "We find the analysis of Kravitz to be controlling and incorporate it here." Id.
109. Id. Justice Zappala reiterated the three prong test of the Surrick "analytical
matrix" and stated,
Applying the test of Surrick . . .we consider whether the area is logical for
development and growth, the degree to which it is developed, and whether
the exclusion is partial or total. Springfield Township is not a logical area
for development and growth.
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reasonably related to the public health, safety and welfare" of the community. 110 Elocin is an important addition to Pennsylvania zoning law because
it establishes that a substantially, though not fully,I1 I developed community
will be relieved from the obligation of further accomodating the housing
needs of an expanding society.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Since National Land, which was decided in 1965, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court has recognized that zoning may not be used to frustrate the
satisfaction of regional housing needs."12 However, rather than assume responsibility for imposing an affirmative duty upon municipalities to zone for
those persons in the region who need housing, the court has been reluctant to
take an active role in the exclusionary zoning arena.
This reluctance to impose an affirmative duty upon suburban communities to accommodate regional housing needs is first illustrated by the early
cases of National Land, Concord Township, and Girsh, wherein the justices attempted to eradicate the exclusionary effect of freezing population density
levels by employing a piecemeal approach. 1 3 Specifically, the justices required municipalities to rezone tract size where the challenged mischief was
large-lot zoning, and required local zoning boards to grant approval for
apartment development where the exclusionary result was due to a total ex4
clusion of multi-family housing. 1
The insufficiency of these analyses soon became evident as townships
discovered "tokenism." By allocating only a token amount of acreage for
apartment development, suburban communities could effectively preserve
their low-density character without falling prey to the mandate that municipalities may not frustrate population growth by totally excluding
5
apartments."1
110. Id.
111. Id. at 351, 461 A.2d at 772. Springfield Township contains approximately
160 acres of undeveloped land.
112. See National Land, 419 Pa. 504, 532, 215 A.2d 497, 612 ("[a] zoning ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers . . . can not
be held valid").
113. For a discussion of the National Land and Concord Township decisions, see
notes 17-37 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Girsh, see notes 38-61
and accompanying text supra.
114. See, e.g., Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 365 (1970) (reversing order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County upholding zoning scheme which did
not provide for apartments); NationalLand, 419 Pa. at 504, 215 A.2d at 597 (affirming
order of Court of Common Pleas of Chester County that zoning ordinance providing
for four-acre minimum lot requirements was unconstitutional).
115. See, e.g., Wdilh'town, 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466 (1975). In its earlier Girsh
decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the zoning municipality in
that case, which did not provide for multi-family development, "must provide for
apartments in its plan for future growth." Girsh, 438 Pa. at 246, 273 A.2d at 339.
Hence, by allocating only a token amount of acreage for multi-family development,
the township of Willistown attempted to maintain its suburban nature without fall-
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NOTE

In a seemingly proper response, a plurality of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania adopted a fair share approach." 6 However, this approach, as
applied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, does not serve to provide adequately for population growth. For example, the Pennsylvania fair-share
obligation requires only that municipalities provide a fair share of total
township acreage for apartment development.1 7 This requirement does not
necessarily benefit moderate income families since a municipality's zoning
board could grant approval only for luxury apartments, beyond the financial means of such families." 18 In this manner, a suburban community could
preserve its exclusive nature by selectively admitting affluent persons and by
neglecting to provide housing for various categories of persons in need of
housing. It is suggested that even though the fair-share approach is more
jurisprudentially satisfying than a piecemeal approach to exclusionary zoning, the adoption of a fair-share standard by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court cannot be considered an activist position since it does not require municipalities to provide for an economically-balanced fair share of
development.
Regardless of this weakness, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has developed the fair-share approach into a complex "analytical matrix."' 19 Although this analytical matrix was utilized initially in Surrtck to invalidate a
zoning ordinance found to be exclusionary, recent decisions demonstrate
that the Surr'ck analysis can be used as a shield against development. In the
Kravitz and Elocin decisions, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the
Surrick test and enabled zoning municipalities to absolve themselves from the
obligation to provide housing by establishing that the community is either
not in the path of future development or is already substantially develing prey to the Girsh mandate. For a discussion of Gzrsh, see notes 38-56 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Wilhsown, see notes 68-75 and accompanying
text supra. It is observed that Upper Providence Township also attempted to utilize
"tokenism" in order to sustain its zoning scheme in light of the Girsh decision. See
Surrck, 476 Pa. at 182, 382 A.2d at 105 (zoning scheme permitted apartments only
within 1.14% of total township acreage).
116. Witlistown, 462 Pa. 445, 449-50, 341 A.2d 466, 468 (1975) ("[o]ur review of
this record convinces us that the zoning ordinance which provides for apartment
construction in only 80 acres out of a total of 11,589 acres in the township continues
to be 'exclusionary' in that it does not provide for afair share of the township acreage
for apartment construction") (emphasis added).
117. See Surrick, 476 Pa. at 195-96, 382 A.2d at 112 (township "has not provided
a 'fair share' of the township acreage for apartment construction").
118. See note 86 supra. In Pennsylvania, the only relief granted pursuant to an
exclusionary zoning challenge is site-specific relief. See Hyson, supra note 2, at 332-34.
Hence a developer could successfully challenge a zoning scheme on the ground that
the scheme is exclusionary and then proceed to develop only luxury apartments. See,
e.g., Girsh, 438 Pa. at 238, 263 A.2d 396 (1970) ("appellant sought a building permit
to construct two nine-story luxury apartments"). Moreover, the probability of this
occurrence is increased by the fact that only landowners have standing to challenge
the zoning scheme. For a discussion on the statutory limits to standing in Pennsylvania, see note 27 supra.
119. Surrick, 476 Pa. at 183, 382 A.2d at 105. For a discussion of the SurrITck
analytical matrix, see notes 76-87 and accompanying text supra.
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oped. 120 These decisions may be viewed as further evidence of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reluctance to take a position which would fulfill its
stated desire to accommodate regional housing needs. In light of these judicial developments, it is submitted that if Pennsylvania is truly committed to
providing housing for her citizens, she must take one step backwards, before
she may proceed forward in resolving the exclusionary zoning dilemma.121
Deborah S. Melamul

120. For a discussion of the Kravitz and Elocin decisions, see notes 88-111 and
accompanying text supra.
121. See Developments in the Law--Zoning, supra note 2, at 1639-40. Pennsylvania
has implemented its judicial attacks by designating favored uses. Id. This implementation should be compared with that of New Jersey and New York, which require
that communities provide for an "appropriate variety and choice of housing." Id.
The Harvard commentators suggest this difference in theory is more than merely
semantic. Id. at 1640. The commentators have submitted the following:
Concern for balanced housing [such as in New Jersey] would seem to lead
to broader judicial activism in reshaping offending plans, since creating a
balanced community necessarily involves review of the entire ordinance.
Limiting the court's focus to protecting specific uses may not solve the underlying aspect of exclusionary practices; providing an area for apartments
while maintaining large-lot zoning for single family homes everywhere else
may serve to ensure contained exclusion. Thus the more informed view
would seem to favor the broader vision of assuring an adequate overall mix
of residential uses.
Id.
It is therefore suggested that in light of this difference in approach between the
Pennsylvania and New Jersey supreme courts, even the Elocin and Kravitz decisions
represent a step backwards for the Pennsylvania court in two respects: first, despite
the utilization of the Surrick "fair share" test, the cases represent a return to principles
of favored uses; second, by disregarding any protection that townhouses may have
previously enjoyed under the Commonwealth's interpretation of Girsh, the Pennsylvania court has further impaired the possibility that municipalities would provide
an overall mixture of residential uses.
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